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Sino-ROK Relations at 15:
An Overview and Assessment
Taeho Kim*
Abstract
For the past 15 years since their diplomatic normalization
China and South Korea (ROK) have improved their bilateral ties to
such an extent that each represents for the other one of the largest, if
not the largest, trade and investment partners. China is also
perceived as playing an essential role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks
over North Korean nuclear issues and other likely major issues on
the Korean peninsula. Yet, there also exists a growing yet littlediscussed list of potential problems and issues underlying their
otherwise prosperous relationship. Prime examples include the North
Korean “refugees” in China, the history of Koguryo, and the longerterm “rise of China”. After identifying principal trends and major
developments in China’s post-Cold War relationships with South
Korea in particular and with the two Koreas in general this paper
examines actual and likely future differences between China and
South Korea on a panoply of peninsular and regional issues,
including the evolving US-South Korean alliance relationship.
Overall, in short, the current state of the Sino-South Korean
relationship can be likened to standing right in the eye of the typhoon
without knowing where the shelter is.

Introduction
On 24 August 2007 both China (the People’s Republic of China) and
South Korea (the Republic of Korea) will celebrate the fifteenth
*
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New Nexus in Asia?” organized by Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lingnan
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by Korea Foundation support.
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anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties between the two countries.
The result, in brief, has been a resounding success or - to quote
Chairman Mao Zedong -“dizzy with success.”
As widely publicized, there has been a remarkable improvement in all
major aspects of their bilateral relations. In particular, China now has
emerged as the ROK’s “four number ones”: its largest trading partner,
its largest export market, its largest trade-surplus source, and its top
outbound investment destination. It is indeed music to a Korean
economist’s ears as the ROK economy has remained stagnant and its
US$ 23.4-billion trade surplus with China in 2005 constituted almost
all of the country’s total trade surplus (i.e., $23.5 billion)!1
For China, the ROK constitutes its third-largest trading partner - after
only the United States and Japan - and was the largest source of foreign
investment in 2005. Furthermore, China is widely perceived as having
played and will play an essential role in the ongoing Six-Party Talks
and other likely major issues on the Korean Peninsula. While there is
no shortage of impressive economic and trade statistics, it suffices to
note that the significance of their bilateral relations is unquestioned.
Moreover, as emphatically noted during the mutual visits by their top
leaders such as President Roh Moo-hyun (October 2006) and Premier
Wen Jiabao (April 2007), the prospects for growth in the non-economic
aspects of their bilateral ties are equally promising as well, if not more
than the economic one. At the same time, the South Korean public unlike their counterparts in Japan and the United States - has over the
years maintained a favorable view of China and perceived that the
latter’s role on Korean peninsular issues would increase in the future.
As discussed in greater detail below, however, their interests could be
significantly in conflict with each other when they are confronted with
some concrete issues and longer-term agendas on the Korean peninsula
1

Unless noted otherwise, all statistical data concerning China’s relations with the two Koreas
are based on the official publications of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT). Occasionally, such primary sources as the data compiled by the Trade Research
Institute (TRI) of the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) are employed; but they
can be easily corroborated with those of the MOFAT. All currencies in the essay are
measured in U.S. dollars.
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and in the East Asian region. Prominent examples include, but are not
limited to, a North Korean contingency, the future status of the US
forces in Korea (USFK), the question of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) in North Korea, and the military capability and strategic
orientation of a unified Korea. It is equally important to note that,
notwithstanding the dawning reality of a “rising China,” South Korea’s
China policy is both a means and a subordinate goal of its longer-term
national security objectives.
This paper attempts to shed some light on these little-discussed yet
highly consequential aspects of the Sino-ROK relationship not only by
addressing their 15-year ties but also by gauging their future ties in a
balanced and comprehensive manner. After identifying principal trends
and major developments in China’s post-Cold War relationships with
South Korea in particular and with the two Koreas in general, it
examines actual and likely future differences between China and South
Korea on a panoply of peninsular and regional issues. The paper then
addresses South Korea’s emerging security challenge of balancing the
American alliance and Chinese cooperation. Overall, it poses a critical
question: how would the China factor play out in South Korea’s future
security environment and in the evolving US-South Korean
relationship?
To telegraph the major arguments and findings of this paper, the
seeming “convergence” of interests between Beijing and Seoul in many
aspects of their bilateral ties does not necessarily mean that the former
is supportive of South Korea’s major policy goals - especially when
they come to concrete issues or longer-term questions on the Korean
peninsula. They share “common aversions”, not “common interests”, in
a sense that both countries share a desire to avoid war on the peninsula
and to prevent North Korea’s nuclearization. 2 It is thus necessary to
understand correctly that the ongoing trends and developments in South
Korea’s interactions with the United States and China could be those of
such a fundamental, sustaining, and impregnated nature as to warrant

2

This is the term used by Brad Glosserman for describing the longer-term nature of the SinoROK relationship. See his “US-China: The Next Alliance?” South China Morning Post, 30
October 2003.
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educated guesses and reasoned speculations for the unfolding future
strategic configuration on the Korean peninsula and beyond.
China’s Post-Cold War Relations with the Two Koreas
Before analyzing China’s relationships with South Korea in particular
and with both Koreas in general, it is necessary to understand the two
major undercurrents that have buttressed China’s Korea policy. One is
the importance of the Korean peninsula in the eyes of the Chinese for
strategic and economic reasons, and the other is its evolving policy
goals toward the Korean peninsula.
To begin with, the Korean peninsula encapsulates China’s continuing
yet elusive quest to restore its past glory, to make a “rich country,
strong army” (fuguo qiangbing), and to achieve great-power status. For
one thing, not only was Korea traditionally part of the Sinocentric
world-order up to the mid-19th century, it was also there that the
fledgling People’s Republic of China confronted the mighty United
States 50 years ago. For another, the 1992 Sino-South Korean
normalization and their fast-growing economic and other ties testify to
the vicissitudes of post-Cold War politics and the validity of China’s
ongoing reform and open-door policy. For still another, as North
Korea’s newest nuclear gambit and South Korea’s security hedging
behavior portend, China’s potential to become a full-fledged major
power will likely be tested again on the rapidly changing yet uncharted
Korean peninsula. This fundamental fact has taken on a new relevance
in light of the global discourse over the “rise of China” - be that
“China’s peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), 3 “China’s peaceful

3

See, for example, Xia Liping and Jiang Xiyuan, Zhongguo Heping Jueqi [China’s Peaceful
Rise] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Chubanshe, 2004); Zheng Bijian, “China’s
Peaceful Rise and Opportunities for the Asia Pacific Region,” China Strategy, Vol. 3 (July
20, 2004), pp. 2-4.

4

development” (heping fazhan)
(weixielun).5

4

or the “China threat theory”

For this reason, throughout the 1990s and continuing to date China has
pursued a set of identifiable and consistent policy goals toward the
Korean peninsula. They include: a) stability and tension reduction a la
denuclearization; b) economic cooperation with South Korea and
traditional ties with North Korea; c) its own role and influence, which
often come at the expense of the ubiquitous United States; and d)
harmonization of its peninsular interests with its global and regional
ones— most notably its own unification agenda with Taiwan.
Notwithstanding a host of unforeseen developments and shocks since
the 1990s on the peninsula and beyond - including the first and second
nuclear crises, the sudden death of Kim Il Sung, and America’s regional
hegemony, there is no doubt that China’s policy toward the Korean
peninsula has achieved an overall success. This can be broadly
grouped
into
three
major
issue-areas:
economic/trade,
political/diplomatic, and military/security.
Economic/Trade Issue-areas
Since their diplomatic normalization in 1992 China and South Korea
have improved their economic relationship remarkably, for a
confluence of factors. The normalization itself opened a huge market
and cheap labour in China to the Korean companies, which were
struggling with rising labour costs in the wake of Korea’s own
4

For the difference between “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development,” see Sukhee Han,
“The Rise of China and East Asia’s Changing Order (in Korean), New Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3
(Autumn 2004), pp. 113-34, particularly pp. 116-23.
5
There is simply too much literature on the “China threat.” Most representative single volumes
include Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s
Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000); Edward Timperlake and
William C. Triplett, Jr., Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to
America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999). For various reactions from the regional actors to
a rising China, see Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths, and Reality (Richmond, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed.,
The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
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economic success in the 1970s and 1980s. An ensuing adjustment in
Korea’s economic structure, together with geographical proximity and
comparative advantage in capital and technology-intensive goods, has
allowed the Korean companies to concentrate on the newly-found
Chinese market.
A $6.4-billion trade in 1992 grew over 20 percent annually to record
US$23.7 billion in 1997, $31.3 billion in 2000, $57 billion in 2003,
and $118 billion in 2006 - making each one the other’s major trading
partner (See Table 1 below). In 2003, for instance, China for the first
time emerged as South Korea’s largest export market and by the end of
2004 China had become South Korea’s largest trading partner as well.6
Table 1. Trends of the ROK’s Trade and
Investment with China, 1992-2005
Exports
Value

Increase
Rate

(million dollars, percentage)
Investment
on China

Imports
Value

China/Overseas
Investment

Increase
Rate

Balance

Case

Value

Case
(%)

Value
(%)

1992

2,654

164.7

3,725

8.3

-1,071

170

141.1

34.2

11.6

1993

5,151

94.1

3,929

5.5

1,222

381

264.0

55.4

20.9

1994

6,203

20.4

5,463

39.0

740

841

632.1

56.6

27.5

1995

9,144

47.3

7,401

35.5

1,742

748

839.5

56.5

26.8

1996

11,377

24.4

8,539

15.4

2,838

734

892.9

50.2

19.7

1997

13,572

19.3

10,117

18.5

3,456

628

718.6

48.0

19.6

1998

11,944

-12.0

6,484

-35.9

5,460

258

676.6

41.4

16.2

1999

13,685

14.6

8,867

36.7

4,818

454

347.6

41.9

12.1

2000

18,455

34.9

12,799

44.3

5,656

753

605.0

37.1

8.4

2001

18,190

-1.4

13,303

3.9

4,888

1,022

543.6

48.0

29.9

2002

23,754

30.6

17,400

30.8

6,354

1,361

977

55.55

27.56

2003

35,110

47.8

21,909

25.9

13,201

1,666 1,490

59.97

39.71

2004

49,763

41.8

29,585

35.1

20,178

1,746 1,598

57.62

36.00

2005

61,915

24.4

38,648

30.5

23,267

2,232 2,580

51.1

40.3

6

According to the recent data released by the MOFAT, South Korea’s trade with China in
2006 was $118 billion with a surplus of $21 billion. According to the Chinese statistics—
which includes the ROK’s trade portions with Hong Kong, it was $134.3 billion with a deficit
of $45.3 billion.
6

Source: Compiled from the database of the Korea International Trade Association
(www.kita.net).

On the other hand, their bilateral trade structure has over the years
shifted from “inter-industry trade” to “intra-industry trade” - a logical
consequence of China’s economic catching-up. In particular, the trend
of an increasing intra-industry division of labour has become obvious
in a wide range of manufacturing industries such as petrochemicals,
textiles, iron and steel, machinery, electronics, and automobiles (See
Table 2 below.).
Table 2. Intra-industry Index Between the ROK and China
Manufactures

Petrochemicals

1992

11.96

1996

Machinery

(percentage)

Textiles

Steel

Electronics

Automobiles

2.30

7.37

11.47

9.39

22.37

4.52

20.76

5.26

13.26

17.32

9.10

56.07

2.93

2000

26.03

3.40

15.91

12.77

15.48

52.53

14.73

2005

30.21

4.24

23.13

22.39

26.67

48.98

8.08

Source: Database of the Korea International Trade Association (www.kita.net).

At the same time, in the ROK’s 2005 exports to China semi-finished
goods and parts/components occupied 42 percent and 40 percent,
respectively. It is well known that foreign companies stationed in China
have played an increasingly important role in Sino-ROK trade. As such,
foreign companies’ import shares from Korea increased from 24.7
percent to 55.5 percent in the period from 1995 to 2004.
According to Choong Yong Ahn, a noted Korean expert on the Chinese
economy, the bilateral trade in technology and goods has also changed
to a more high-tech-oriented one. The high-tech share of ROK’s exports
to China rose from 8.1 percent to 41.5 percent over the period from
1995 to 2005, while that of China increased from 9.7 percent to 31.7
percent in the same period.7

7

Choong Yong Ahn, “Overview of Trends in China-South Korea Economic Relationship,” a
paper delivered at a conference on “China and Korea: Partners or Competitors?” cosponsored by the Asia Foundation and Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), Press
Center, Seoul, Korea, June 13, 2006, p. 6.
7

China is also the ROK’s top outbound investment destination. In 2005
alone, US$2.6 billon was registered by Korea, an increase of $1 billion
from that of the previous year (See Table 1 above.). The amount
accounted for 40.3 percent of the ROK’s total overseas investment
value in that year. According to Korea Ex-Im Bank statistics, out of
Korea’s cumulative investment of $9.9 billion in China by October
2004 a whopping 85.46 percent (or $ 8.5 billion) was made in the
manufacturing sector, indicating the ROK’s over-dependency on China
in terms of export, investment, and the manufacturing sector as well.8
The ROK’s cumulative investment in China by the end of 2006 hovered
around $17 billion in 15,900 cases and served as a complement to its
growing exports to China.9
All in all, there is no doubt that China’s rapid economic modernization
presents Korea with both an opportunity and a challenge, especially as
its economy has remained stagnant for years. This in turn calls for an
adoption of a panoply of new economic strategies on the part of Korea
not only in the Chinese market but also in the global market. Included in
the new strategies is the continuing sustenance of the ROK’s
comparative advantages in selective sectors (e.g., telecommunications,
semiconductors, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and automobiles).
Additionally, Korean companies have taken measures to diversify
investment patterns and areas, concentrate on selected commodities and
social strata, and “localize” their research and development (R&D)
centres and factories in China. These strategies, if successful, are likely
to prolong the ROK’s relative competitiveness vis-à-vis that of China
for a certain period of time. The same strategies, however, could pose a
8

As is often the case with trade figures, there is a far cry between the ROK’s and China’s
official figures on Korean investment in China. For instance, the ROK’s official data indicate
that its cumulative investment in China by June 2004 was $9.2 billion, while the Chinese official
figure was $23.2 billion, which is based on the execution basis. The contracted amount was
much larger, which was $42.3 billion by the same period. Choong Yong Ahn cites that by
June 2005 Korea’s accumulated FDI to China was $12.02 billion, which is a total of 13,600
cases on the arrival basis and 48.4 percent of the ROK’s total outbound FDI cases - which is
closely collaborated with those figures of mine.
9
According to China’s official statistics, the ROK’s cumulative investment in China by the end
of 2006 was $34.9 billion in 43,130 cases. See also Eun Mee Kim and Jai S. Mah, “Patterns
of South Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment into China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 56, No. 6
(November/December 2006), pp. 881-97.
8

political and security question to the ROK that has been little discussed
and is under-researched in Korea.
On the people-to-people contacts, a total of 5.3 million people visited
the other country in 2006.10 The frequency of contacts between the two
sides is evidenced by over 20,000 Korean companies in operation
throughout China, 779 passenger flights per week (i.e., over 110
passenger flights per day) between six Korean cities and 30 Chinese
cities, and by about 57,000 Korean students in China, which means that
as there are over 160,000 foreign students in China one out of every
three foreign students in China comes from South Korea!11 An array of
other impressive statistics abounds as to tourism, educational and
cultural ties - most notably “Korean waves” (Hanliu) or “China fever”between the two countries. This positive trend, which is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future, would undoubtedly contribute to the
ROK’s economic development. At the same time, however, it should be
remembered that its increasing economic dependency on China is a
double-edged sword which could restrain the ROK’s diplomatic
options by allowing China to enhance its position and influence on the
peninsula.
In a sharp contrast, Sino-North Korean economic relations have been
severely constrained for many reasons including their different
economic structures, North Korea’s economic and financial problems,
and North Korea’s self-imposed diplomatic isolation. Even if China
remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for an
average 40 percent of the latter’s total trade, their two-way trade fell
like a descending stair from the highest $900 million in 1993 to $656
million in 1997 to $488 million in 2000. Since then, however, it has

10

In 2006 a total of 4.4 million South Koreans visited China, while 900,000 Chinese made a
visit to South Korea. These figures are, of course, the number of visits, not the number of
actual people as many visited the other country multiple times a year.
11
The figures are drawn from an interview with the ROK’s ambassador to the PRC. See
Yonhap News, 9 January 2007.
9

gradually increased from $740 million in 2001 to $1,023 million (i.e.,
$1.023 billion) in 2003 to $1,580 million (i.e., $1.58 billion) in 2005.12
A set of structural economic problems such as chronic fiscal and trade
deficits, low competitiveness of its export goods, and lack of hard
currency has long prohibited the improvement of North Korea’s trade
relationship with China. In fact, North Korea’s principal export items to
China such as non-ferrous metals are in short supply within North
Korea as well, demonstrating again the gravity of its economic
predicament. As long as the principles of the market economy reign in
Beijing, prospects for an improved trade relationship with Pyongyang
look bleak for the foreseeable future.
In fact, contrary to Chinese officials’ wishful utterances on the
resilience of its Communist neighbour, the depth of North Korea’s
economic problems is real and could become much worse in the years
to come. 13 For the sake of its own interests including peninsular
12

An increase in China’s exports to North Korea for the past few years should be interpreted
as a form of Chinese assistance. The question of North Korea’s dependency on Chinese oil
and food has recently taken on new relevance in the discussion of possible international
sanctions against North Korea. According to various official ROK documents, North Korea
imported an average one million tons of oil from China in 1991-96 but it fell to a half million
tons and below since 1997. Its grain import from China is far more complicated to account
due in part to China’s own harvest level and export policy, but approximately 300,000 tons of
grain have been imported from China since 1997. For a series of recent but higher-level
accounts of North Korea’s oil and grain imports from China, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China
Must
Pressure
Pyongyang
(December
17,
2002),”
available
at
www.heritage.org/Press/Commenrary/ed123102b.cfm; Phillip P. Pan, “China Treads Carefully
Around North Korea,” Washington Post, January 10, 2003, p. A14; Phillip C. Saunders and
Jing-Dong Yuan, “Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese Diplomacy,” Asia Times, January 8, 2003;
Matthew Forney, “Family Feud: China vs. North Korea,” Time, December 23, 2002; and
Mark O’Neill, “Beijing Faces a Stern Test Over Nuclear Crisis in Its Back Yard,” South
China Morning Post, January 3, 2003. A recent report indicated a modest increase of trade
volume between the two countries in 2006 from $1.58 billion in 2005 to $1.7 billion. See
Yonhap News, 20 February 2007.
13
For an excellent discussion on the depth and prospect of North Korea’s economic
problems and their various effects, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Persistence of North Korea,”
Policy Review, October/November 2004, pp. 23-48; Chaiki Seong, “A Decade of
Economic Crisis in North Korea: Impacts on the Military,” The KIDA Papers, No. 3
(October 2003), pp. 1-9; Paul VanWagenen, “U.S. Economic Sanctions— Non-traditional
Success against North Korea,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 32, No. 1
(Fall 2000), pp. 239-61.
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stability, China encourages the North Korean leadership to undertake
reform measures aimed at more fundamental resolution of their
economic problems. If the North Korean regime indeed takes a
fundamental reform path, however, it will surely be the most perilous
moment for regime survival. Pyongyang’s choice has been “deterrence
through instability.” This, in short, constitutes China’s longer-term
strategic dilemma as to the North Korean question. 14
Political/Diplomatic Issue-areas
Chinese attempts to strike a balance in its approach to both Koreas and
to maintain traditional ties with North Korea have so far produced a
mixed result due to a combination of factors, including North Korea’s
closed nature, external hostility and self-imposed isolation. While it is
difficult to pinpoint the date, China for some time has wished to
transform its traditional ties with Pyongyang based on ideological
affinity and particularistic ties to a more mutually beneficial, state-tostate relationship. But the course of actions North Korea followed in
the 1990s reveals that its interests diverge from those of China.
As a matter of fact, a series of major developments on the peninsula
throughout the last decade and beyond, such as the simultaneous entry
into the United Nations by both Koreas, South Korea’s diplomatic
normalization with the Soviet Union and China, its opposition to North
Korea’s attempt to replace the extant Armistice Agreement with a peace
treaty with the United States, and the Chinese arrest of Yang Bin
(designated by North Korea as the head of
a new special
administrative area) in spite of the apparent protestation by North
Korea - to name but a few - further demonstrated the strained
relationships between North Korea and China and the latter’s overall
“convergence” of interests with South Korea’s.
On the other hand, aside from the vast improvement in their economic
and other relationships, China and South Korea now regularly hold
high-level meetings. On the Chinese side as well, the new lineup of the
14

For a further discussion of the issue, see Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign
Relations in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007).
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so-called “fourth-generation leadership” after the Sixteenth Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Congress in November 2002, in which those
with substantial provincial or bureaucratic background were
represented, strongly indicates China’s continuing priority on economic
development, which depends on regional and peninsular stability,
amongst others. 15 In short, the generational turnover in the Chinese
leadership, in tandem with its need to maintain political and social
stability, is likely to reinforce its current pragmatic policy orientation
toward the Korean peninsula. In a nutshell, it can be plausibly argued
that China’s domestic economic reform, coupled with the end of the
bipolar Cold War, has had the most far-reaching impact on the
evolution of the relationship between China and the two Koreas and
would continue to put an emphasis on the importance of growing ties
with Seoul.
Military/Security Issue-areas
In a similar vein, since the early 1990s and particularly after the death
of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, security and military ties between China
and North Korea have increasingly been subject to the rigidity of their
political relations and China’s national interest-based policy toward
the Korean peninsula. Lack of mutually beneficial agenda, North
Korea’s domestic problems, and growing Sino-South Korean ties have
also militated against the continued development of their bilateral
relationship in this important issue-area.
In fact, their political and military contacts have undergone several
different phases. From April 1989 to August 1992, General Secretaries
Kim Il Sung (three times), Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin and all their
defense and foreign ministers visited the other’s capital. Even during
the period from Beijing-Seoul normalization in August 1992 to the
death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, ranking Chinese officials such as Hu
Jintao, Qian Qichen, and Chi Haotian as well as North Korean military
15

See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, “Leadership Change and Chinese Political
Development,” China Quarterly, No. 176 (December 2003), pp. 903-25. For a discussion
on the prospects for U.S-China relations under Hu Jintao, see Jaewoo Choo, “Hu Jintao’s
Foreign Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations: From A [sic] Korean Perspective,” New Asia, Vol.
11, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 80-112.
12

officers such as Choi Kwang, Ok Bong Lin, and Kim Il Chul made
mutual visits. But there were no summit meetings.
In particular, from the death of Kim Il Sung until June 1999, when
Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Kim Young Nam
visited China, there had been an appreciable decline in the frequency
and the rank of Chinese visitors. Since the death of Kim Il Sung the
nonmilitary, working-level contacts between the two sides were made
mostly at the vice-ministerial level and among their respective
international liaison, foreign affairs, economic and provincial-level
units. Overall political and military contacts between Beijing and
Pyongyang have also shown a gradual but an unmistakable decline.
Even the military-to-military contacts between their ranking officers
have been mostly good-will visits and are symbolic and ceremonial in
nature, not task-oriented meetings on salient military and security
issues.16
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s May 2000 visit to China - which
was followed by his subsequent visits to China in January 2001, April
2004, and January 2006 - as well as the feverish diplomatic activities
that followed are undoubtedly intended to alleviate the growing pains
of the North’s deepening economic and diplomatic vulnerabilities as
well as to arrest a further deterioration in its strained relationship with
China. There are, however, no appreciable effects on their military-tomilitary contacts in particular and on their overall ties in general.
Visits in the first half of the 2000s by such top Chinese leaders as Jiang
Zemin (September 2001), Jia Qinglin (May 2002), Wu Bangguo
(October 2003), Li Changchun (September 2004), and Hu Jintao
(November 2005) helped to restore the level of Chinese visits, but their
practical significance should not be exaggerated.17 Finally, it is entirely
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For a detailed analysis on the military-to-military relationship between China and North
Korea up to 1997, see Taeho Kim, “Strategic Relations Between Beijing and Pyongyang:
Growing Strains amid Lingering Ties,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds.,
China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 295-321; idem.,
Recent Changes in Sino-North Korea Relations and the ROK’s Policy Options (Seoul:
KIDA, 2001 in Korean), pp. 60-68.
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For an analysis on the mutual visits between Beijing and Pyongyang, see Yonhap News,
September 24, 2004.
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possible that having maintained mutual contacts of little substance for
over a decade both Chinese and North Korean militaries are now
undergoing a serious yet little-publicized version of their own “alliance
fatigue.”18
Similarly, while China still maintains the July 1961 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with North Korea (the
only country with which China has a formal military alliance), the treaty
has been widely interpreted in Beijing and elsewhere to be operative
only when North Korea faces an unprovoked attack from an outside
enemy - a highly unlikely event. It is ironic to note that many Asian
security analysts and officials now believe that having a Chinese treaty
obligation to a vulnerable North Korea would almost certainly help
contribute to stability on the peninsula.
Between South Korea and China, on the other hand, there have been
more frequent, more regular, and higher-level visits in recent years in
the so-called “military exchanges and cooperation” field. 19 Divided
into three aspects - i.e., high-level visits (e.g., defense and service
chiefs), working-level contacts (short-term visits and mutual
consultation), and military academic and research exchanges
(conferences and sports events) - their militaries have gradually but
steadily increased the scope of military-to-military exchanges and
cooperation. It should be noted, however, that compared with the other
nonmilitary aspects of their bilateral ties the “military exchanges and
cooperation” have yet to be balanced and institutionalized.
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Alliance fatigue, which is a natural symptom for any old alliance relationship, is particularly
acute in the Sino-North Korea case as there is a growing divergence of interests between the
two. See Sukhee Han, “Alliance Fatigue amid Asymmetrical Interdependence,” Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 155-79.
19
This does not mean, however, that their military-to-military ties are balanced or symmetrical
in terms of frequency and the ranks of the visiting officers. For a comprehensive treatment of
the PLA’s military diplomacy in the 1990s in general and China's military relations with both
Koreas, see Kenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), esp. pp. 66-68.
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Some Salient Issues between South Korea and China
It is noteworthy that the above developments between South Korea and
China have resulted in a shift in the South Korean public’s perception
of China to that of a benign, pragmatic economic partner - for better or
worse. In fact, popular South Korean images of China are difficult to
generalize and have become more diverse over the years. Reflecting
their checkered relationships with the outside world in general and
China in particular throughout the 20th century, South Koreans eye
China in essentially three different images: a traditional great power, an
image which had been built upon their largely unequal yet amicable
pre-19th century ties; a Cold-War adversary represented by their hostile
experience during the Korean War (1950-53) and thereafter; and a new,
pragmatic country with the so-called “good-neighborly, friendly
relationship,” which has been formed after the Sino-South Korean
normalization in 1992.
Besides, there exists a spectrum of opinions within South Korean
society regarding the most desirable state of bilateral ties between
itself and China. A small but growing number of human rights activists,
together with religious, agricultural, and environmental groups, are
most critical of China’s policies in their respective areas of concern.
China’s (mis)handling of North Korean “refugees” in China, its
opposition to the visit by the Dalai Lama to Seoul, and a host of trade
disputes are most recent examples.20
At the opposite end of the spectrum are a sizable number of people who
subscribe to the “comprehensive cooperative partnership” (quanmian
hezuo huoban guanxi) between the two countries. Those with
commercial, governmental, and other institutional ties with China tend
to be in favor of a stable and prospering relationship with China, even
if the looming economic implications of a rising China have made them
more sober than before. Understandably, the rapid improvement in
20

The Chinese government’s position is that there are no North Korean “refugees,” let alone
dissidents, in its territory. Its position has triggered a series of strong protests from various
NGOs based in South Korea and elsewhere. See the editorial, Chosun Ilbo, December 11,
1999, p. 2. On cases of trade dispute see KOTRA, Dae joongkuk muyeok bunkyu sarye
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2002).
15

Sino-South Korean ties throughout the 1990s has generated a thick web
of individual and institutional interests within South Korean society,
which remain sympathetic to Beijing.
Of greater relevance to this study is how the South Koreans perceive
the value of China and of the US-South Korean alliance in comparative
terms. 21 To make a long story short, up to the early 2000s the South
Korean public’s view remained “somewhat critical” toward the United
States and “fairly friendly” toward China, whereas the policy elite
aired the opposite view - that is, “somewhat critical” toward China and
“fairly friendly” toward the United States. It is worthy of note,
however, that the Korean public’s favorable perception toward China
plummeted after the Koguryo issue [see below] had erupted in 2004.22
At least for the past three years since the summer of 2004, the United
States has been singled out as the “most friendly (to the ROK)” or the
“most supportive of Korean unification” in a host of nationwide opinion
surveys.
The “China threat” argument, on the other hand, is distinctly a minority
opinion aired by only a few people scattered in the media, military, and
ideological communities. There also exists an essential consensus
among the Korean business community that notwithstanding South
Korea’s growing over-dependence with China the latter will remain as
an opportunity rather than as a threat to the future of their business. Few
foreign-policy analysts in Seoul, including both China and non-China
academicians, institutional specialists, and journalists, are vocal about
the possibility of a Chinese military threat to the Korean peninsula or
advocate policies to “deter,” “contain,” or “constrain” China, unlike
their counterparts in Washington.
21

An excellent perceptual study on this critical issue of Korea’s emerging strategic problems is
available. See Derek J. Mitchell, ed., Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the
United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2004); Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon:
Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5
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After the election for National Assembly members, 63 percent of the ruling party members
(Woori Party) favored a closer ties with China compared with the United States. After the
Koguryo case became a diplomatic row between the two countries, the figure plummeted to
10 percent or below. Similar results can be found in other opinion surveys. See, for example,
Yonhap News, August 10, 2004 and Media Daum, August 19, 2004.
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On the other hand, while the Beijing and the Seoul governments have
long maintained that they see eye to eye with each other on a host of
peninsular issues - at least in their official proclamations and high
rhetoric - there exist subtle but important differences between the two
on the issues of Korean unification, the USFK, the North Korean
nuclear and missile programmes, and the US-Japan alliance ties, to
name but a few.
For one thing, Article 5 of the August 1992 Joint Declaration on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the ROK and the PRC
reads: “The PRC government respects the Korean people’s desire to
have the Korean Peninsula unified peacefully at an early date and
support a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula by the Korean
people” (italics added). 23 Since then, all ranking Chinese officials,
when asked, have articulated their support for a peaceful, independent,
and gradual unification of the Korean peninsula. Then, a question
naturally arises: What if the unification is not peaceful, not independent
(devoid of US involvement?) or not gradual? To the best knowledge of
this author, none of the numerous ranking Chinese officials have ever
answered this question to the point. As noted at the beginning of this
article, China’s prime objective toward the Korean peninsula is
“stability,” not unification - which is the ROK’s national security
objective. The fact remains that China’s support for Korean unification
is not unconditional.
Moreover, since the early 2000s and continuing to date the plight of the
North Korean “refugees” (or “illegal economic migrants” by Chinese
definition) has become a very salient bilateral issue between the two
countries as well as for the international community.24 While there were
growing numbers of North Koreans entering into foreign embassies,
international schools, and other sanctuaries in Beijing in the first half of
the 2000s, the PRC government’s position remains adamant: the issue
touches upon China’s sovereignty and ethnic issues and thus can be
23

Unofficial translation by the author.
For the strategic context of the issues, see Jaeho Hwang, “Northeast Asia’s Pandora’s Box:
North Korean Escapees,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring
2004), pp. 49-72.
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resolved only between the PRC and North Korea. Besides, it argues,
the issues should be handled according to - in descending order of
importance - Chinese domestic law, international law, and humanitarian
concern. There is a far cry between China’s efforts to project an
international image as an up-and-coming responsible power in the
world and the often brutal handling of the North Korean refugees
against their wishes.
In addition, the Chinese project known as “Northeast Project” (dongbei
gongcheng), to incorporate the history of Koguryo into their own
history, is the gravest of all potential problems between the two
countries.25 While the Chinese government averred that the project was
an academic endeavor that was begun in 2002 by such provincial-level
governments as Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, it is anything but an
academic one. In fact, the “Northeast Project” had begun much earlier,
in 1996, by the regional academies of social sciences located in the
three northeastern provinces mentioned above and was ratified by none
other than Hu Jintao, the current Party General Secretary and then a
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, as a national-level
project. It is for these reasons that the project was then led by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the party’s policydevelopment organ, and that three-trillion Korean won and a manpower
of about 1,500 were able to be devoted to it. In brief, it is a political,
not an academic, project of the Chinese central government.
In light of the expected objections from both North and South Korea as
well as from the world community, what prompted China to engineer
the historical distortions? First, it stands to reason that the steady power
shift in Northeast Asia - including China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear
crisis, readjustments in the US-ROK alliance, and Japan’s elevated
status in the US East Asia strategy - must have a place in it. Second,
North Korea’s future and the two-million strong ethnic Koreans in the
25

See a flurry of newspaper reports on the subject including B. J. Lee, “Historical
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northeastern provinces must remain a serious concern for China’s
political leaders and strategists. Third, a unified Korea’s possible
claim over the Gando region - which extends to much of Manchuria well into the future can be nipped in the bud should any ancient
histories of China’s current northeastern region be incorporated as part
of China’s own proud and rich history. 26
Table 3. Chinese and South Korean Positions on Some Salient Peninsular and Regional Issues
Issues
Chinese Positions
South Korean Positions
History of
• Part of China’s ancient history in its
• The issue touches upon Korea’s
Koguryo
peripheral regions
national identity and historical
• (Aware South Koreans’ sensitivity to the
continuity
issue) want a “quiet” and academic
• Call for both academic and
approach
diplomatic approach
Korean
• Support peaceful (and “independent”)
• Peacetime confidence-building
Unification
unification
measures necessary for a North
• In fact, prefers stability to unification
Korean contingency
• De facto support for the North Korean
• Differences exist for specifics
regime
• Call for discussions on postunification relations
North Korean
• Support a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula
• North Korea’s nuclear gambit is a
nuclear Issue
• Maintain stability and peace on the Korean
threat to the peninsula and beyond
Peninsula
• Call for a diplomatic and multilateral
• Resolve the issue in a diplomatic and
solution, including China’s
peaceful manner
“constructive” role
North Korean
• A sensitive issue that touches upon
• Forcible repatriation of them to
refugees in
China’s sovereignty, territories, and ethnic
North Korea unacceptable
China
issues; “no refugees” in China
• A humanitarian issue
• A bilateral issue between China and North • A bigger issue in waiting when
Korea, not South Korea
Korea is unified
US Forces in
• Principled opposition to the stationing of
• A stabilizing factor on the
Korea
foreign troops
peninsula and in the region
• A historical issue to be discussed between • Never raise the issue with China
South Korea and the US
• Focus of the post-unification USFK
• Remain wary of its possible role against
is regional stability
China or a Taiwan contingency
North Korea
• Every country’s sovereign right
• Major source of instability and
missile (re-)
• Opposes international pressure on North
missile development
launching
Korea
• Danger of missile proliferation
• Will do “what it can”
• Call for China’s “constructive” role
Strengthened
• “Asian edition of NATO”
• Contributes to peninsular and
US-Japan
• Will lead to Japan’s rearmament
regional stability
alliance
• Wary of its anti-China and Taiwan
• A bilateral issue between the U.S.
contingency role
and Japan
Theatre
• Opposes it for a number of reasons
• North Korea as a primary rationale
Missile
• Welcomes South Korea’s nonfor its development
Defence
participation
• South Korea’s geographical,
economic, technical reasons
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For this line of reasoning, see Jun-young Kang, “Hidden Motives behind China’s Northeast
Project,” Korea Herald, 24 August 2004. The publication date, it should be noted, is the 12th
anniversary of the ROK-PRC diplomatic normalization.
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While the South Koreans have so far believed in China’s position that
an academic issue should be resolved in academic terms only, the
dawning reality is that the “Northeast Project” is nothing but the
Chinese government’s official project, aided by the media, the
academic and policy units, and regional governments. The project and
the lessons thereof should awaken the Korean people to the dangers of
the self-fulfilling prophecy about China. Additionally, the recent “China
bashing” in South Korea, largely triggered by the issue of historical
distortion, should be harnessed into a new opportunity not only to
rethink China’s strategic intentions towards the Korean peninsula but
also to dispel the self-centered “China fantasy” many of us have held up
to now.
While the above three issues remain the most salient ones, there are
many other potential problems that may come to the surface one day. An
overview of potential sources of differences between China and South
Korea is provided in Table 3.
Balancing the American Alliance and Chinese Cooperation: South
Korea’s Emerging Strategic Challenge

The relationship between the United States and China is widely
believed to be probably the most consequential bilateral ties in the
contemporary world, whose impact reverberates throughout global and
regional issues. It is thus encouraging to note that both the United States
and China have since September 11, 2001 worked together to improve
their otherwise fragile relationship in such diverse areas as
international terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear moves, and most
recently their military-to-military contacts. On the other hand, it should
also be acknowledged that despite their global pretensions and their
derivative self-acclaimed role for peace and stability the world over,
the United States and China are countries with different attitudes,
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diverging perspectives, and conflicting world-views. 27 These
differences are often brought to bear in their handling of regional and
peninsular issues.
For instance, notwithstanding the long list of their outstanding disputes
at both the bilateral and regional levels, China and the United States
have time and again argued, at the official and declaratory level at
least, that they share a set of common interests over the Korean
peninsula – namely, peninsular stability, denuclearization, North-South
Korean dialogue, and peaceful reunification. The question is: why?
In light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political systems,
social values, and strategic objectives, notwithstanding their recent
“normalizing” efforts, it is far more logical and - I would argue - more
empirically valid to make a case that the United States and China are
likely to remain divergent over peninsular issues as well. Beneath the
façade of the “constructive, cooperative, and candid relationship” - the
Bush administration’s official China policy - moreover, their interests
could be significantly in conflict with each other when confronted with
some concrete issues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examples
include, but are not limited to, a North Korean contingency, future status
of the USFK, and military capability and strategic orientation of a
unified Korea.
It is also possible that future political thaw on the peninsula, as we
thought within our reach in the months after the June 2000 North-South
Korean summit, could also accentuate, and at a minimum has increased
the uncertainty over, a host of issues that involve the United States,
China, and the Koreas.28 Therefore, in light of the possibility for SinoAmerican competition, their likely diverging interests over the
27
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peninsula, and the “rise of China” (which is largely a fact of life, not an
assumption, for most East Asian states including South Korea), South
Korea needs to continuously prioritize its strategic relationships with
the United States and with China. In practical terms as well as for the
sake of its national interests, this means that the ROK should be able to
reap the benefits of its alliance ties with the U.S. in addressing the
growing importance of the “China factor.” 29
In a similar vein, future changes in inter-Korean relations could have a
significant impact on the future course of the peninsula and the South
Korean-US security relationship. Likewise, recent changes in both
domestic and external dimensions in both South Korea and the United
States have not only influenced the nature of the alliance, but have also
raised new issues or old issues in a new form which are endogenous to
the security alliance. While those substantive issues are largely
subordinated to both countries’ national interests so far, they could
become sources of strain for the alliance if left unresolved for long.
As perhaps their divergent perceptions of and policies towards a series
of ongoing North Korean nuclear crises (e.g., the “Six-Party Talks”)
best illustrate, 30 the South Korean and the US governments need to
coordinate their policy toward North Korea more tightly and more
coherently than has been the case. Policy differences over North Korea
do not augur well for the long-term development of the South KoreanUS alliance, especially if they have to prepare for the day when they
29
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“run out of common enemies.” It is these kinds of specific policy issues
and longer-term questions that South Korea needs to take into
consideration in formulating its strategic plan for its future security
environment.
Looking Ahead
In closing this paper, it is appropriate to sum up the findings and
arguments with respect to the questions raised at the outset. First, as
long as China holds fast to its ongoing reform drive, continued stability
on the Korean peninsula is a key to its economic and other interests, so
that it would try to prevent a renewed conflict on the peninsula. For the
same reason, China will continue to promote a friendly and beneficial
relationship with South Korea and at the same time it would try to
retain its lingering ties with North Korea, but it is highly likely that their
economic ties would be increasingly subject to economic logic,
structural trade problems, and the state of other issue-areas. In the midto longer-term, moreover, China would seek to transform its traditional
“special” ties with Pyongyang based on ideological affinity and
particularistic bonds to a more normal, state-to-state relationship based
on hard-nosed national interests and mutual benefits.
Second, the seeming “convergence” of interests - common aversions in
fact - between Beijing and Seoul in major aspects of their bilateral ties
does not necessarily mean that the former is supportive of South
Korea’s major policy goals, especially when they come to concrete
issues or longer-term questions on the Korean peninsula. Under such
circumstances and for the foreseeable future South Korea’s “strategic
prioritization” in its relations with the United States and with China
would be highly likely to be the most optimal strategic choice, even if
South Korea should continuously and systematically pursue a specific
set of confidence-building measures with China.
Third, in light of the longer-term Sino-American competition, their
likely diverging interests over the peninsula, and China’s growing
influence over the Korean peninsula, it is entirely possible that China
will become a source for both despair and hope in realizing South
Korea’s national objectives. While its growing economic and social
interdependence with China is highly encouraging and should be
23

continued, South Korea should also aware of its attendant costs in other
issue-areas, namely, diplomatic and security ones. In a similar vein, the
intrinsic value of the “China factor” in South Korea’s evolving security
environment lies not in its supposed balancing role against a ubiquitous
and unilateral America, but in its potential and likely role in ensuring
peace on the peninsula - with Korean unification included. In the long
and often tortuous path to Korean security and unification, China will
be no substitute for the United States for the foreseeable future.
Fourth, it is this complex set of major external challenges that the ROK
leadership will face for many years to come. How well and in what
manner they handle the challenges could significantly affect not only the
wealth and health of the Republic but also the future of the nation,
including reunification. Furthermore, now that both the domestic and the
international contexts upon which the ROK’s foreign and security
policies have been predicated are also undergoing extraordinary
changes, it is necessary to understand correctly that the ongoing trends
and developments in South Korea’s interactions with the United States
and China could be those of a fundamental, sustaining, and impregnated
nature which warrant cooler thinking on the unfolding future strategic
configuration on the Korean peninsula and beyond.
In addition, South Korean concerns with China now range from its
increasing economic dependency to its heretofore reliance on China’s
role in the Six-Party Talks to China’s recent economic inroads into
North Korea. To the best of this author’s knowledge, in recent years
there have been an increasing number of Korean ‘China scholars’ who
are more vocal about Seoul’s accommodative approach to Beijing.
Sukhee Han, for example, has argued to such an extent that China’s
preferred goal is not de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the
prolongation of regime stability in North Korea. Doobok Park, for
another, has opined that South Korea’s policy inflexibility comes from
its own [standards] set higher than China expects. For still another,
Dong-ryul Lee has pointed out that the [South Korean] government’s
undue expectation on the [constructive] role of China in enhancing
North-South Korean relations has [ironically] set up an obstacle for the
same goal.

24

Barring any unforeseen developments in the near future, it is highly
likely that a mixture of economic convergence, political anxiety, and
military indifference would define the ROK’s overall interactions with
China. Economically, there exists an essential consensus among the
Korean business community that China is probably the last resort for
their survival at least for the time being. This sense of urgency on the
part of business community would likely push for a higher level of
industrial and technological cooperation between the two countries.
While the ROK government has recently instituted a system of
protection mechanisms in response to the growing concern with
technology leakage, its effectiveness is likely to be severely tested due
to the growing economic interactions with China as well as to the
technological nature of the problem.
It should also be borne in mind that a combination of factors such as
economic over-dependency, the Koguryo case, and China’s economic
inroads into North Korea have begun to feed political anxiety in South
Korea. One outcome has been an about-face in the perception of China
at the public, opinion-maker, and elite levels in South Korea. Another
is an emerging “dual hedging” strategy by the ROK government that has
been discernible for the past two years, in which China’s behaviour has
played a major part. 31 Taken together, the ROK government seems to be
caught between American coercive diplomacy toward and Chinese
cooptation of North Korea, while a recalcitrant North Korea has made
little room for the ROK government to maneuver, let alone a major role,
in managing Korean affairs.
Finally, it should be noted that, while the above developments are
largely externally driven, South Korea’s changing domestic political
dynamics remain an important variable in its future interactions with
China. In retrospect, China has served as a useful policy tool for the
current ROK government’s peninsula-centered and populist ideology,
which is often seen as opposed to that of an imposing and unilateral
America. But the term of the presidential office has less than one year
left; the president’s popularity rate is as low as ever. Besides, in light
of the pervasive popular disbelief toward the government’s major
31
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policies - e.g., the government reaction to the North Korean launching
of missiles and the ROK-US free trade agreement, it would be virtually
impossible for the ROK government to take any major policy initiative,
especially when a domestic consensus is absent.
It is this complex context against which the ROK’s overall interactions
with China should be understood. In the mid- to longer-term, it is
entirely possible that South Korea’s political divergence with China on
specific and concrete issues would affect the erstwhile discrete
interactions with China in other dimensions. One cost-effective way of
coping with this future uncertainty is to maintain exchanges and
cooperation with China in select areas, while anticipating and
preparing for a reversal of its present course toward the Korean
peninsula.
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